ANIMAL RIGHTS FAQS

	ANIMAL RIGHTS AND ANIMAL WELFARE
	Five Frequently asked Questions
	The distinction between animal rights and animal welfare is central to the debate about the nature and direction of social efforts to eradicate animal exploitation. We, too, must be prepared to confront this distinction as well and to recognize that animal rights and animal welfare represent very different-and inconsistent-approaches. There is a great deal of confusion about the rights/welfare debate, and these questions are an attempt to present one perspective on trying to resolve this confusion.
	1.	Can the distinction between animal rights and animal welfare be explained simply?
		All Animal welfare theories accept that animals have interests. However it is generally felt that these interests may be sacrificed or traded as long as there are some expected results that are thought to justify that sacrifice. The primary difference among welfare theories is what actually constitutes a justification. Some welfarists will ignore animal interests for the sake of human amusement and financial gain; others require more "serious" benefits..2 One aspect which is common is that all welfare theories insists that any animal exploitation should be done "humanely" and that animals are not be subjected to "unnecessary" pain. The central and distinguishing principle shared by rights theorists is that animals (Like humans) have interests that cannot be sacrificed or traded away simply because good consequences will result. The rights position does not hold that rights are absolute. Indeed, rights must be limited, and they often conflict. For example, I have an interest in my liberty which is protected by a constitutional right, but the right is not absoluteg. can forfeit my right to liberty for examine, I commit a crime. We do not, however, allow liberty rights to be abrogated simply because depriving one person of liberty might increase overall social welfare.
	2.	What difference does the distinction between animal rights and animal welfare make in the real world?
		It makes all the difference in the world. Our legal system currently reflects a welfarist approach, and it clearly does not work. The law recognizes that animals have interests in being treated "humanly" or in being kept free from "unnecessary" suffering .The laws require that we "balance" human interests against these animal interests; despite such laws, we still have bullock cart racing, administration of Oxytocin, circuses, etc. These uses of.3 animals are completely "unnecessary" and "inhuman" as these terms are used in ordinary language. The reason for the failure to protect animals is found in the legal statues of animals as the property of human beings. Animals may have interests, but these interests may be trated away or sacrificed even when the primary reasons for the sacrificing the interest is completely trivial "benefit" in the form of human amusement and entertainment'. As animals are regarded as property, it is almost always in some human's interest to exploit those animals.
	3.	What difference does the distinction between animal rights and animal welfare make in the real world?
		In our socity, property rights are among the most highly valued of all human rights. Most human/ animal conflicts occur precisely because a human property owner seeks to exploit his or her animal property. Even if we increase the weight attached to the animal interests, the human property rights cannot be abrogated without a compelling justification. No animal interest is likely to be regarded as supplying that compelling as interest as long as animals are regarded as the property of.4 their owners. No from of animal welfare is likely to be successful as long as all animal interests may be sacrificed for consequential reasons alone and there are no absolute prohibitions on at least some forms of animal exploitation. Attaching more weight to animal interests in "humane" treatment may sound good in principle, but is wholly meaningless in the context of the current system.
	4.	Doesn't animal rights require an "all or nothing "attitude in that right theory can offer no practical strategy short of complete and immediate abolition of animal exploitation?
		No. Ironically, there are important opportunities for us to move in a right direction even within our present legal system. Currently, regulations of animal exploitation recognize animal interests only in so far as they facilitate the efficient use of animals as determined by human owners of nonhumans. For example, the protection offered by "humane" slaughter regulations for the most part do not go beyond providing regulation that will make it ultimately cheaper to produce neat by reducing costly injuries to animals (whose meat will then fail to conform to and standards regulations and to workers, who are more likely to be hurt by animals in panic or pain. Such regulations, which require nothing more than the "humane" treatment of animals recognize no interests that are not subject to.5 being sacrificed or traded away in favour of human property interests. There are, however, other types of regulations that are much closer to rights, and that can have a real effect on animal suffering and animal death. In order to be effective, such regulations must have three features:
		1. The regulation must prohibit and not merely attempt to regulate exploitation through the use of the "humane" treatment/"unnecessary" suffering standard; 2. The regulation must clearly reflect the recognition of on animal interest that is not subject to being sacrificed or traded away for consequential reasons alone; and  3. The interest recognized and prohibited should be consistent with the status of the animal as a sentient being with inherent value and not as human property; that is, the prohibition ends a particular form of exploitation, and does not merely substitute a different, and supposedly more "humane" form of exploitation. For example, if Government were to stop funding, thereby effectively stopping, the use of all animals in burn experiments, that would effectively constitute a prohibition. Just as a important, however, is the recognition that the prohibition is not imposed in order to.6 facilitate more efficient animal use; it is imposed out of respect for an animal interest that can not be sacrificed even if it were in the interest of humans to do so. Finally, the interest that is recognized is consistent with the status of the animal as other than human property. The prohibition does not "substitute" a supposedly more "humane" form of exploitation instead of the burn experiment. Although animals will continue to be used for other types of experiments, this is neither required nor prescribed by the prohibition of burn experiments.
		This third feature distinguishes the prohibition on burn experiments from a "prohibition" of, say, more than two hens in a battery cage .The letter may demonstrate features (1) and (2) in that although certain overcrowding is "prohibited "in order to recognize and respect an animal interest, the regulation fails condition (3) because it is consistent with the continued status of the hens as human property that may properly be exploited in a supposedly more "humane" manner. This "prohibition" merely substitutes one form of exploitation for another, which makes it different from the above example concerning burn experiments. Respect-based prohibitions that satisfy these three criteria move away from the paradigm of animals as property and offer an arguably sensible half-measure between continuing the approach of animal welfare, or beginning to chip away -peacefully and through legal means -at the morally, politically, and economically corrupt edifice that supports animal exploitation. When.7 accompanied by clear and unequivocal calls for ultimate abolition, respect-based prohibitions may be effective in reducing animal suffering and in dismantling the primary mechanism of animal oppression
	5.	Isn't animal right a "terrorist" doctrine?
		Of all of the very unfair distortions of truth that pervade the endless media outlets, this characterization is the most unfair. Animal rights originated with the same ancient people for whom Ahimsa, or what has been called "dynamic harmlessness," was a central organizing principal for social, political, and religious relations. Animal rights is not a movement of violence or terrorism. It is a movement of peace. One of the central tenets linking most animal rights people (i.e., people who reject speciesism and the property status of animals on principled grounds) is their rejection of violence on all forms of life. Working to achieve respect-based prohibitions in the law is consistent with this rejection of violence. The attempt to pin the "terrorist "label on the animal rights movement is part of the organized backlash against a more progressive vision of animal liberation, and to intimidate people into accepting animal welfarism - a position much more acceptablet the people who profit from animal exploitation and who label those who reject welfarism as "terrorists"..8
		GENERAL QUESTIONS
	6.	What is all this Animal Rights (AR) stuff and why should it concern me?
		The fundamental principle of the AR movement is that nonhuman animals deserve to live according to their own natures, free from harm, abuse, and exploitation. This goes further than just saying that we should treat animals well while we exploit them, or before we kill and eat them. It says animals have the RIGHT to be free from human cruelty and exploitation, just as humans possess this right. The withholding of this right from the nonhuman animals based on their species membership is referred to as "speciesism". Animal rights activists try to extend the human circle of respect and compassion beyond our species to include other animals who are also capable of feeling pain fear, hunger thirst, loneliness and kinship. When we try to do this, many of us come to the conclusion that we can no longer support factory farming, vivisection and the exploitation of animals for entertainment. One main goal of this FAQ is to address the common justifications that arise when we become aware of how systematically our society abuses and exploits animals. The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could.9 have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. - Jeremy Bentham (philosopher) Life is life -weather in cat, or dog or man. There is no difference there between a cat or a man. The idea of difference is a human conception for man's own advantage… Sri Aurobindo (poet and philosopher) Non-violence leads to the highest ethics, which is the goal of all evolution. Until we stop harming all other living beings, we are still savages. Thomas Edison (inventor) The time will come when men such as I will look upon the murder of animals as they now look on the murder of men. - Leonardo Da Vinci (artist and scientist)
	7.	Is the Animal Rights movements different from the Animal Welfare movement?
		The Animal Welfare movement acknowledges the suffering of nonhumans and attempts to reduce that suffering through "humane" treatment, but it does not have as a goal elimination of the use and exploitation of animals. The Animal Rights movement goes significantly further by rejecting the exploitation of animals and according them rights in that regard. A person committed to animal.10 welfare might be concerned that cows get enough space, proper food, etc., but would not necessarily have any qualms about killing and eating cows, so long as the rearing and slaughter are "humane". It should however, be realized that some hold a broader interpretation of the AR movement. They would argue that the AW groups do, in fact, support rights for animals (e.g., a dog has the right not to be kicked). Under this interpretation, AR is viewed as a board umbrella covering the AW and strict AR groups. This interpretation has the advantage of moving AR closer to the mainstream. Nevertheless, there is a valid distinction between the AW and AR groups, as described above. Animal Liberation (AL) is, for many people, a synonym for Animal Rights (but see below). Some people prefer the term "liberation "because it brings to mind images of other successful liberation movements, such as the movement for liberation of slaves and liberation of women, whereas the term "rights" often encounters resistance when an attempt is made to apply it to nonhumans. The phrase "Animal Liberation" became popular with the publication of Peter Singer's classic book of the same name. This use of the term liberation should be distinguished from the literal meaning discussed in question 85, i.e., an Animal liberationist is necessarily one who engages in forceful civil disobedience or unlawful action. Some might suggest that a subtle distinction can be made between the Animal Liberation and Animal Rights movements. The Animal Rights movement, at least as.11 propounded by Regan and his adherents, is said to require total abolition of such practices as experimentation on animals. The Animal Liberation movement, as propounded by Singer and his adherents, is said to reject the absolutist view and assert that in some cases, such experimentation can be morally defensible. Because such cases could also justify some experiments on humans, however, it is not clear that the distinction described reflects a difference between the liberation and rights views, so much as it does a broader difference of ethical theory, i.e., absolutism versus utilitarianism. Historiclly, animal welfare groups have attempted to improve the lot of animals in society. They worked against the popular Western concept of animals as lacking souls and not being at all worthy of any ethical consideration. The animal rights movement set itself up as an abolitionist alternative to the reform-minded animal welfarists. As the animal rights movement has become larger and more influential, the animal exploiters have finally been forced to respond to it. Perhaps inspired by the efforts of Tom Regan to distinguished AR from AW, industry groups intent on maintaining the status quo have embraced the term "animal welfare". Provivisection, hunting, trapping, agribusiness, and animal entertainment groups now refer to themselves as "animal welfare" supporters. Several umbrella groups whose goal is to defend these practices have also arisen. This classic case of public -relations doublespeak acknowledges the issue of cruelty to animals in name only, while allowing for the continued use and abuse of animals. The propaganda effect.12 is to stigmatize animal rights supporters as being extreme while attempting to portray themselves as the reasonable moderates. Nowadays, the cause of "animals welfare" is invoked by the animal industry at least as often as it is used by animal protection groups.
	8.	What exactly are rights and what right can we give animals?
		The concept of "rights has been a source of controversy and confusion in the debate over AR.A common objection to the notion that animals have rights involves questioning the origin of those rights. One such argument might proceed as follows: Where do these rights come from? Are you in special communication with God, and he has told you that animals have rights? Have the rights been granted by law? Aren't rights something that humans must grant? It is true that the concept of "rights" needs to be carefully explained. It is also true that the concept of "natural rights" is fraught with philosophical difficulties. The confusion between legal rights and moral rights further complicates the issues. One attempt to avoid this objection is to accept it, but to argue that if it is not an obstacle for thinking of humans as having rights, then is should not be an obstacle for thinking of animals as having rights Henry Salt wrote: Have the lower animals" rights?" Undoubtedly yes - if men have..13 That is the point being made in this chapter. The fitness of this nomenclature is disputed, but the existence of some real principle of the kind can hardly be called in question; so that the controversy concerning "rights" is little else than an academic battle over words, which leads to no practical conclusion .I shall assume, therefore, that men are possessed of "rights," in the sense of Herbert Spencer's definition; and if any of my readers object to this qualified use of the term, I can only say that I shall be perfectly willing to change the word as soon as a more appropriate one is forthcoming .The immediate question that claims our attention is this- if men have rights, have animals their rights also? Satisfying though this argument may be, it still leaves us unable to respond to the sceptic who disavows the notion of rights even for humans. Fortunately, however, there is a straightforward interpretation of "rights" that is plausible and allows us to avoid the controversial rights rhetoric and underpinnings. It is the notion that a "right" is the flip side of a moral imperative. If ethically, we must refrain from an act performed on a being, then that being can be said to have a "right "that the act not be performed .For example, if our ethics tells us that we must not kill another, then the other has a right not to be killed by us. This interpretation of rights is in fact, an intuitive one that people both understand and readily endorse. (Of course, rights so interpreted can be codified as legal rights through appropriate legislation.).14 It is important to realize that, although there is a basis for speaking of animals as having rights, that does not imply or require that they possess all the rights that humans possess, or even that humans possess all the rights that animals possess. Consider the human right to vote. (On the view taken here, this would derive from an ethical imperative to give humans influence over actions that influence their lives.) Animals lack the capacity to vote. There is, therefore, no ethical imperative to allow them to do so, and thus they do not possess the right to vote. Similarly, some fowls have a strong biological need to extend and flap their wings; right-thinking people feel an ethical imperative to make it possible for them to do so. Thus, it can be said that fowls have the right to flap their wings. Obviously, such a right need not be extended to humans. The rights that animals and humans possess, then, are determined by their interests and capacities. Animals have an interest in living, avoiding pain , even in pursuing happiness(as do humans ).As a result of the ethical imperatives, they have rights to these things(as do humans). They can exercise these rights by living their lives free of exploitation and abuse at the hands of humans.
	9.	Isn't AR hypocritical, e.g., because you don't give rights to insects or plants?
		The general hypocrisy argument appears in many forms. A typical form is a follows: "It is hypocritical to.15 assert rights for a cow but not for a plant; therefore, cows cannot have rights." Arguments of this type are frequently used against AR. Not much analysis is required to see that they carry little weight. First, one can assert a hypothesis A that would carry as a corollary hypothesis B. If one then fails to assert B, one is hypocritical, but this does not necessary make A false. Certainly, to assert A and not B would call into question one's credibility, but it entails nothing about the validity of A. Second, the factual assertion of hypocrisy is often unwarranted. In the above example, there are grounds for distinguishing between cows and plants (plants do not have a central nervous system), so the charge of hypocrisy is in justified .One may disagree with the criteria, but assertion of such criteria nullifies the charge of hypocrisy. Finally, the charge of hypocrisy can be reduced in most cases to simple speciesism. For example, the quote above can be recast as: "It is hypocritical to assert rights for a human but not for a plant; therefore, humans cannot have rights." To escape from this reductio ad absurdum of the first quite, one must produce a crucial relevant difference between cows and humans, in other words, one must justify the speciesist assignment of rights to humans but not to cows. For questions dealing specifically with insects and plants, refer to question #38 through # 45. Finally, we must ask ourselves who the real hypocrites are .the following quotation from Michael W. Fox describes the grossly.16 hypocritical treatment of exploited versus companion animals. "Farm animals can be kept five to a cage two feet square, tied up constantly by a two-foot-long tether, castrated without anesthesia, or branded with a hot iron .A pet owner would be no less than prosecuted for treating a companion animal in such a manner; an American president was, in fact morally censure a merely for pulling the ears of his two beagles."
	10.	What right do AR people have to impose their beliefs in others?
		There is a not-so-subtle distinction between imposition of one's views and advertising them .AR supporters are certainly not imposing their views in the sense that, say, the Spanish Inquisition imposed its views, or the Church imposed its views on Galileo. We do, however, feel a moral duty to present our case. There is ample precedent for this: protests against slavery, protests against the Vietnam War, condemnation of racism, etc. One might point out that the gravest imposition is that of the exploiter of animals upon his innocent and defenseless victims. If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear. George Orwell (author).17
	11.	Isn't AR just another religion?
		NO .The dictionary defines s "religion" as the appeal to a supernatural power. (An alternate definition refers to devotion to a cause; that is virtue that the AR movement would be happy to avow.) People who support Animal Rights come from many different religions and many different philosophies. What they share is a belief in the importance of showing compassion for other individuals, whether human or nonhuman.
	12.	Doesn't it demean humans to give rights to animals?
		A tongue-in -cheek, though valid, answer to this question is given by David Cowles-Hamar: " Humans are animals, so animal right are human rights!" In a more serious vein, we can observe that giving rights to women and back people does not demean white males. By analogy, then giving right to nonhumans does not demean humans. If anything, by being morally consistent, and widening the circle of compassion to deserving nonhumans, we ennoble humans. The greatness of a nation and its and its moral progress can be judged by the way its animals are treated. Mahatma Gandhi (statesman and philosopher) It is man's sympathy with all creatures that first makes him truly a man..18 Albert Schweitzer (statesman, Nobel 1952) For as long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other. Indeed, he who sows the seed of murder and pain cannot reap joy and love. Pythagoras (mathematician).19
		ANIMALS AND MORALITY
	13.	There is no correct or incorrect in morals; you have yours and I have mine, right?
		This position, known as moral relativism, is quite ancient but became fashionable at the turn of century, as reports on the customs of societies alien to those found in Europe became available. It fell out of fashion, after the Second World War, although it is occasionally revived. Ethical propositions, we are asked to believe, are no more than statements of personal opinion and, therefore, cannot carry absolute weight. The main problem with this position is that ethical relativists are unable to denounce execrable ethical practices, such as racism. On what grounds can they condemn (if at all) Hitler's idea on racical purity? Are we to believe that he was uttering an ethical truth when advocating the Final Solution? In addition to the inability to denounce practices of other societies, the relativists are unable to counter the arguments of even those whose society they share. They cannot berate someone who proposes to raise and kill infants for industrial pet food consumption, for example, if that person sees it as morally sound. Indeed, they cannot articulate the concept of societal moral progress, since they lack a basis for judging progress. There is no point in turning to the relativists for advice on ethical issues such as euthanasia, infanticide, or the use of fetuses in research..20 Faced with such arguments, ethical relativists sometimes argue that ethical, truth is based on the beliefs of a society; ethical truth is seen as nothing more than a reflection of societal customs and habits. Butchering animals is acceptable in the West, they would say, because the majority of people think it so. They are on no firmer ground here. Are we to accept that chattel slavery was right before the US Civil war and wrong thereafter? Can all ethical decisions be decided by conducting opinion polls? It is true that different societies have different practices that might be seen as ethical by one and unethical by the other. However, these differences result from differing circumstances .For example, in a society where more survival is key, the diversion of limited food to an infant could detract significantly from the well being of the existing family members that contribute to food gathering. Given that, infanticide may be the ethically correct course. The conclusion is that there is such a thing as ethical truth (otherwise, ethics becomes vacuous and devoid of proscriptive force). If there were such a thing as "ethical truth", then there must be a way of determining it. An example of the method of leveraging a person's morality is to ask the person why he has compassion for human beings. Almost always he will agree that his compassion does not stem from the fact that: 1) humans use language, 2) humans compose symponies, 3) humans can plan in the far future, 4) humans have a written,.21 technological culture, etc. Instead, he will agree that it stems from that fact that humans can suffer, feel pain, be harmed, etc. It is then quite easy to show that nonhuman animals can also suffer, feel pain, be harmed, etc. The person's arbitrary inconsistency in not according moral status to nonhumans then stands out starkly. To a man whose mind is free there is something even more intolerable in the sufferings of animals than in the sufferings of man. For with the latter it is at least admitted that suffering is evil and that the man who causes it is a criminal. But thousands of animals are uselessly butchered every day without a shadow of remorse. If any man were to refer to it, he would be through ridiculous. And that is the unpardonable crime. Romain Rolland (author, Nobel 1915) .
	14.	The animals are raised to be eaten; so what is wrong with that?
		This question has always seemed to me to be a fancy version of "But we want to do these things, so what is wrong with that?" The idea that an act, by virtue of an intention of ours, can be exonerated morally is totally illogical. But worse than that, however, is the fact that such a belief is a dangerous position to take because it can enable one to justify some practices that are universally condemned. To see how this is so, consider the following restatement of the basis of the question: "Suffering can be.22 excused so long as we bred them for the purpose." Now, cannot an analogous argument be used to defend a group of slave holders who breed and enslave humans and justify it by saying "but they 're bred to be our workers "? Could not the Nazis defend their murder of the Jews by saying "but we rounded them up to be killed"? Shame on such a morality that is worthy of pariahs, and that fails to recognize the internal essence that exists in every living thing, and shines forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes that see the sun! Arthur Schopenhauer (philosopher)
	15.	But isn't it true that animals wouldn't exit it we didn't raise them for slaughter?
		There are two ways to interpret this question. First, the questioner may be referring to "the animals" as a species, in which case the argument might be more accurately phrased as follows: "The ecological niche of cows is to be farmed; they get continued survival in this niche in return for our using them." Second, the questioner may be referring to "animals" as individuals, in which case the phrasing might be: "The individual cows that we raise to eat would not have had a life had we not done so." We deal first with the species interpretation and then with the individuals interpretation .The questioner's argument applies presumably to all species of animals; to make things more concrete..23 We will take cows as an example. It is incorrect to assert that cows could continue to exist only if we farm them for human consumption. First, today in many parts of India and elsewhere, humans and cows are engaged in a reciprocal and reverential relationship .It is only in recent human history that this relationship has been corrupted into the one-sided exploitation that we see today. There IS a niche for cows between slaughter / consumption and extinction. (The interested reader may find the book Beyond Beef by Jeremy Refkin quite enlightening on this subject.) Second, Several organizations have program for saving animals from extinction. There is no reason to suppose that cows would not qualify. The species arguments is also flawed because, in fact our intensive farming of cattle results in habitat destruction and the loss of other species .For example, clearing of rain forests for pasture has led to the extinction of countless species. Cattle farming is destroying habitats on six continents. Why is the questioner so concerned about the cow species while being unconcerned about these others species? Could it have anything to do with the fact that he wants to continue to eat the cows? Finally, a strong case can be made against the species argument from ethical theory. Arguments similar to the questioner's could be developed that would ask us to accept practices that are universally condemned .For example, consider a society that breeds a special race of humans.24 for use as slaves. They argue that the race would not exist if they did not breed them for use as slaves. Does the reader accept this justification? Now we move on to the individuals interpretation of the question .One attempt to refute the argument is to answer as follows:"It is better not to be born than to be born into a life of misery and early death." To many, this is sufficient. However, one could argue that the life is miserable before death is not necessary. Suppose that the cows are treated well before being killed painlessly and eaten .Is it not true that the individual cows would not have enjoyed their short life had we not raised them for consumption? Furthermore, what if we compensate the taking of the life by bringing a new life into being? The key is that the AR movement asserts that humans and nonhumans have a right to not be killed by humans .The ethical problem can be seen clearly by applying the argument to humans. Consider the case of a couple that gives birth to an infant and eats it at the age of nine months, just when their next infant is born. A 9 month old baby has no more rational knowledge of its situation or future plans than does a cow, so there is no reason to distinguish the two cases .Yet, certainly, we would condemn the couple. We condemn them because the infant is an individual to whom we confer the right not be killed. Why is this right not to accorded to the cow? I think the answer is that the questioner wants to eat it..25 It were much better that a sentient being should never have existed, than that it should have existed only to endure unmitigated misery. Percy Bysshe Shelley (poet)
	16.	Don't the animals we use have a happier life since they are fed and protected?.
		The questioner makes two assumptions here. First, that happiness or contentment accrues from being fed and protected. and second, that the animals are ,in fact ,fed and protected .Both of these premises can be questioned. Certainly the animals are fed; after all, they must be fattened for consumption. It is very difficult to see any way that, say, factory farmed chickens are "protected ". They are not protected from multilation, because they are painfully debeaked. They are not protected from psychological distress, because they are crowded together in unnatural conditions. And finally, they are not protected from predation, because they are slaughtered and eaten by humans. We can also question the notion that happiness accrues from feeding and protection alone .The Roman galley slaves were fed and protected from the elements; nevertheless, they would presumably trade their condition for one of greater uncertainly to obtain happiness .The same can be said of the slaves of earlier America..26 Final ly, an ethical argument is relevant here. Consider again the couple of question # 15. They will feed and protect their infant up to the point at which they consume it.We would not accept this as a justification. Why should we accept it for the chicken?
	17.	Is the use of service animal and beasts of burden considered exploitative?
		A simple approach to this question might be to suggest that we all must work for a living and it should be no different for animals .The problem is that we want to look at the animals as like children, i.e., worthy of the same protections and rights, and like them, incapable of being morally responsible. But we don't force children into labor! One can make a distinction, however, that goes something like this: The animals are permanently in their diminished state (i.e., incapable of voluntary assenting to work); children are not .We do not impose a choice of work for children because they need the time to develop into their full adult and moral selves. With the animals, we choose for them a role that allows them to contribute; in return, we do not abuse them by eating them, etc If this is done with true concern that their work conditions are appropriate and not of a sweatshop nature, that they get enough rest and leisure time, etc., this would constitute a form of stewardship that is acceptable and beneficial to both sides, and one that is not at odds with AR philosophy..27.
	18.	Moral are a purely a human construction (animals don't understand morals); doesn't that mean it is not rational to apply our morality to animals?
		The fallaciousness of this argument can be easily demonstrated by making a simple substitution :Infants and young children don't understand morals, doesn't that mean that it is not rational to apply our morality to them? Of course not. We refrain from harming infants and children for the same reasons that we do so for adults. That they are incapable if conceptualizing a system of morals and its benefits is irrelevant. The relevant distinction is formalized in the concept of "moral agents" versus "moral patients " A moral agent is an individual processing the sophisticated conceptual ability to bring to moral principles to bear in deciding what to do, and having made such a decision, having the free will to choose to act that way .By virtue of these abilities, it is fair to hold moral agents accountable for their acts .The paradigmatic moral agents is the normal adult human being. Moral patients, in contrast, lack the capacities of moral agents and thus cannot fairly be held accountable for their acts. They do, however, possess the capacity to suffer harm and therefore are proper objects of consideration for moral agents. Human infants, young children, the mentally deficient or deranged, and nonhuman animals are instance of moral patienthood. Given that.28 nonhuman animals are moral patients, they fall within the purview of moral consideration and therefore it is quite rational to accord them the same moral consideration that we accord to ourselves.
	19.	Animals don't care about us; why should we care about them?
		The questioner's position - that, in essence we should give rights only to those able to respect ours- is known as the reciprocity argument. It is unconvincing both as an account of the way our society works and as prescription for the way it should work. Its descriptive power is undermined by the simple observation that we give rights to a large number of individuals who cannot respect ours. These include some elderly people, some people suffering from degenerative disease, some people suffering from irreversible brain damage, the severely retarded, infants, and young children. An institution that, for example, routinely sacrificed such individuals to test a new fertilizer would certainly be considered to be grievously violating their rights. The original statement fares no better as an ethical prescription. Future generations are unable to reciprocate our concern, for example, so there would be no ethical harm done, under such a view, in dismissing concerns for environmental damage that adversely impacts future generations. The key failing of the questioner's position lies in the failure to properly distinguish between the following.29 capacities: the capacity to under stand and respect others right (moral agency) and the capacity to benefit from rights (moral patienthood). An individual can be a beneficiary of rights without being a moral agent, under this view, one justifies a difference of treatments of two individuals (human or nonhumans) with an objective difference that is RELAVANT to the difference of treatment. For example, if we wished to exclude a person from an academic course of study, we could not cite the fact that they have freckles. We could cite the fact that they lack certain academic prerequisite. The former is relevant; the latter is relevant. Similarly, when considering the right to be free of pain and suffering, moral agency is irrelevant; moral patient hood IS relevant. The assumption that animals do not care about us can also be questioned. Companion animals have been known to summon aid when their owners are in trouble. They have been known to offer comfort when their owners are distressed. They show grief when their human companions die.
	20.	A house is on fire and a dog and a baby are inside. Which do you save first?
		The one I choose to save first tells us nothing about the ethical decisions we face .I might decide to save my child before I saved yours, but this certainly does not mean that I should be able to experiment on your child, or exploit.30 your child in some other way. We are not in an emergency situation like a fire anyway. In everyday life, we can choose to act in ways that protect the rights of both dogs and babies. Like anyone else in this situation, I would probably save the one to which I am emotionally more attached. Most likely it would be the child. Someone might prefer to save his own beloved dog before saving the baby of a stranger. However, this tells us nothing about any ethical principles.
	21.	What if I made use of an animal that was already dead?
		There are two ways to interpret this question. First, the questioner might really be making the excuse "but I didn't kill the animal ", or second, he could be asking about the morality of using an animal that has died naturally (or due to a cause unassociated with the demand for animal products, such as a road kill). For the first interpretation, we must reject the excuse .The killing of animals for meat for example, is done at the request (through market demand), and with the financial support (through payment), of the end consumers. Their complicity is inescapable. Society does not excuse the receiver of stolen goods because he "did not do the burglary". Other people may avoid use of naturally killed animal products because they feel that it might encourage a demand in others for animal products, a demand that might not be innocently satisfied. You have just dined, and however scrupulously the slaughterhouse is concealed in the graceful distance of miles, there is complicity - Ralph Waldo Emerson (author)
	22.	Where should one draw the line: animals, insects, bacteria?
		AR philosophy asserts that are to be accorded to creatures that have the capacity to experience pain, to suffer, and to be a "subject of a life ". Such a capacity is definitely not found in bacteria. It is definitely found in mammals, fish, birds and insects. There is debate about such animals as mollusks and arthropods (including insects). One should decide, based upon available evidence and one's own conscience where the line should be drawn to adhere to the principle of AR described in the first sentence..32
	23.	If the killing is wrong, shouldn't you stop predators from killing other animals?
		This is one of the more interesting arguments against animal rights. We prevent human moral patients from harming others, e.g., we prevent children from hitting each other, so why should not we do the same for nonhuman moral patients (refer to question # 18 for a definition of moral patienthood)? If anything, the duty to do so might be considered more serious because predation results in serious harm- death. A first answer entails pointing out that predators must kill to survive; to stop them from killing is, in effect, to kill them. Of course, we could argue that intervening on a massive scale to prevent predation is totally impractical or impossible, but that is not morally persuasive. Suppose we accept that we should stop a cat from killing a bird. Then we realize that the bird is the killer of many snakes, Should we now reason that, in fact, we should not stop the cat? The point is that humans lack the board vision to make all these calculations and determinations. The real answer is that intervenining to stop predation would destroy the ecosystems upon which the biosphere depends, harming all of life on earth. Over millions of years, the biosphere has evolved complex ecosystems that depend upon predation for their continued functioning and stability. Massive intervention by humans to stop predation.33 would inflict serious and incalculable harm on these ecosystems, with devastating results for all life. Even if we accept that we should prevent predation (and we don't accept that), it does not follow that, because we do not, we are therefore justified in exploiting moral patients ourselves. When we fail to stop widespread slaughter of human beings in foreign countries, it does not follow that we, ourselves, believe it appropriate to participate in such slaughter. Similarly, our failure to prevent predation cannot be taken as justification of our exploitation of animals.
	24.	Doesn't the ethical theory of contractarianism show that animals have no rights?
		Contractarianism is an ethical theory that attempts to account for our morality by appealing to implicit mutually beneficial agreements, or contracts. For example, it would explain our refusal to strike other by asserting that we have an implied contract: " you don't hit me and I won't hit you." The relevance of contractarianism to AR stems from the supposition that nonhuman animals are incapable of entering into such contracts, coupled with the assertion that rights can be attributed only to those individuals that can enter into such contracts. Roughly, animals' can't have rights because they lack the rational capacity to assent to a contract requiring them to respect our rights. Contractarianism is perhaps the most impressive attempt to refute the AR position; therefore, it is important.34 to consider it in some detail. It is easily possible to write a large volume on the subject. We must limit ourselves to considering the basic arguments and problems with them. Those readers finding this incomplete or nonrigorous are advised to consult the primary literature. We begin by observing that contractarianism fails to offer a compelling account of our moral behavior and motives .If the average person is asked why they think it wrong to steal from their neighbour, they do not answer that by refraining from it they ensure that their neighbour will not steal from them. Nor do they answer that they have an implicit mutual contract with their neighbour. Instead of invoking contracts, people typically assert some variant of the harm principle; e.g., they don't steal because it would harm the neighbor. Similarly, we do not teach children that the reason why they should not steal is because then people will not steal from them. Another way to point out mismatch the theory of contractarianism and our actual moral behavior is to ask if, upon risking your own life to save my child from drawning, you have done this as a result of a contractual obligation. Certainly, one performs such acts as a response to the distress of another being, not as a result of contractual obligations. Contractarianism can be thus seen as a theory that fails to account for our moral behavior. At best, it is a theory that its proponents would recommend to us a preferable. (Is it seen as preferable because it denies rights.35 to animals, and because it seems to justify continued exploitation of animals?) Arguably the most serious objection to contractarianism is that it can be used to sanction arrangements that would be almost universally condemned. Consider a groups of very rich people that assemble and create a contract among themselves the effect of which is to ensure that wealth remains in their control. They agree by contract that even repressive tactics can be used to ensure that the masses remain in poverty. They argue that by virtue of the existence of their contract, that they do no wrong. Similar contracts could be drawn up to exclude other races, sexes, etc. John Rawls attempts to overcome this problem by supposing that the constractors must begin from an "initial position "in which they are not yet incarnated as beings and must form the contract in ignorance of their final incarnation. Thus, it is argued, since a given individual in the starting positions does not know whether, for example .she will be incarnated as a rich woman or a poor woman, that individual will not form contracts that are based on such criteria .In response, one can begin to wonder at the lengths to which some will go in creating ad hoc adjustments to a deficient theory. But more to the point, one can turn around this ad hoc defense to support the AR position. For surely, if individuals in the initial position are to be truly ignorant of their destiny, they must assume that may be incarnated as animals. Given that, the contract that is reached is likely to include strong protections for animals!.36 Another problem with Rawls' device is that probabilities can be such that, even given ignorance, contracts can result that most people would see as unjust .If the chance of being incarnated as a slave holder is 90 percent, a contract allowing slavery could well result because most individuals would feel they had a better chance of being incarnated as a slave holder. Thus, Rawls' device fails even to achieve its purpose. It is hard to see how contractarianism can permit movement from the status quo. How did alleged contracts that denied liberty to slaves and excluded women from voting come to be renegotiated? Contractarianism also is unable to adequately account for the rights we give to those unable to form contracts, e.g., infants, children, senile people, metal deficient, and even animals to some extent. Various means have been advanced to try to account for the attribution of rights to such individuals' .We have no space to deal with all of them. Instead, we briefly address a few. One attempt involves appealing to the interests of true rights holders. For example .I don't eat your baby because you have an interest in it and I would not want you violating such an interest of mine. But what if no-one cared about a given infant? Would that make it fair game for any use or abuse? Certainly not. Another problem here is that many people express an interest in the protection of all animals. That would seem to require others to refrain from using or abusing animals. While this result is attractive to.37 the AR community, it certainly weakens the argument that contractarianism justifies our use of animals. Others want to let individuals "ride" until they are capable of respecting the contract. But what of those that will never be capable of doing so, e.g., senile people? And why can we not let animals ride? Some argue a" reduced -right "case. Children get a reduced rights set designed to protect them from themselves, etc. The problem here is that with animals the rights reduction is way out of proportion. We accept that we cannot experiment on infants or kill and eat them due to their reduced rights set, Why then are such extreme uses acceptable for nonhumans? Some argue that is irrelevant whether a given individual can enter into a contract; what is important is their theoretical capacity to do so. But, future generations have the capacity but clearly cannot interact reciprocally with us, so the basis of contractarianism is gutted (unless we assert that we have no moral obligations to leave a habitable world for future generations). Peter Singer asks "Why limit morality to those who have the capacity to enter agreements, if in fact there is no possibility of their ever doing so? There are practical problems with contractarianism as well .For example, what can be our response if an individual renounces participation in any implied moral contracts, and states that he is therefore justified in engaging in what others would call immoral acts? Is there any way for us to reproach him? And what are we to do.38 about violations of the contract? If an individual steals from us , he has broken the contract and we should therefore be released from it .Are we then morally justified in stealing from him ? Or worse? In summary, contractarianism fails because a) it fails to accurately account for our actual, real-world moral acts and motives, b) it sanctions contractual arrangements that most people would see as unjust, C) it fails to account for the considerations we accord to individuals unable to enter into contracts, and d) it has some impractical consequences. Finally, there is a better foundation for ethics-the harm principle. It is simple, universalizeable, devoid of ad hoc devices, and matches our real moral thinking..39
		PRACTICAL ISSUES
	25.	Surely there are more pressing practical problems than AR, such as homelessness; have not you got better things to do?
	4:	Inherent in this question is an assumption that it is more important to help humans than to help nonhumans. Some would dismiss this as a speciesistalist position (see question # 6). It is possible, however, to invoke the scale -of life notion and argue that there is greater suffering and loss associated with cruelty and neglect of humans than with animals. This might appear to constitute a prima-facie case for expending one 's energies for humans rather than nonhumans. However, even if we accept the scale -of -life notion, there are sound reasons for expending time and energy on the issue of rights for nonhuman animals. Many of the consequence of carrying out the AR agenda are highly beneficial to humans. For example, stopping the production and consumption of animal products would result in a significant improvement of the general health of the human population, and destruction of the environment would be greatly reduced. Fostering compassion for animals is likely to pay dividends in terms of a general increase of compassion in human affairs .Tom Regan puts it this way:" the animal rights movement is a part of, not antagonistic to, the human rights movement. The theory that rationally grounds the.40 rights of animals also grounds the rights of humans. Thus those involved in the animal rights movement are partners in the struggle to secure respect for human rights-the rights of women, for example, or minorities, or workers. The animal rights movement is cut from the same moral cloth as these. "Finally, the behavior asked for by the AR agenda involves little expenditure of energy .We are asking people to NOT do things: don't eat meat, don't exploit animals for entertainment, don't wear furs. These negative actions don't interfere with our ability to care for humans. In some cases, they may actually make, more time available for doing so (e.g., time spent hunting or visiting zoos an circuses). Living cruelty -free is not a full -time job; rather, it's a way of life When I shop, I check ingredients and I consider if the product is tested on animals. These things only consume in few minutes of the day. These is ample time left for helping both humans and nonhumans. I am in favor of animal rights as well as human rights. That is the way of a whole human being. Abraham Lincoln (16th U.S. President) To my mind, the life of a lamb is no less precious than of a human being Mahatma Gandhi (statesman and philosopher) Our task must be to free ourselves …by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creature and the whole of nature and its beauty. Albert Einstein (physicist, Novel 1921).41
	26.	if every one become vegetarian and gave up keeping pets, what would happen to all animals?
		The animals you eat do not come from the roads or forests. They are forcibly multiplied in factory farms for slaughter. Except for man, left alone, animal populations do not grow uncontrollably. They grow only to that size that can be supported by their natural environment. Nature has herself created a system of checks and balances and it is by killing animals that we are upsetting this balance. For instance in countries where the goat is not eaten you will not find large herds of them. Similarly we do not kill cats to eat; yet they have not taken over the earth. To be a vegetarian is extremely important for the environment and health of not only the individual but of the country, apart from the cruelty it will prevent to thousands of helpless animals. Each meat- eater causes the death of 300 animals a year in the most appalling conditions. Questions by meat-eaters regarding plants also having feelings are raised by a guilty conscience .if he can convince himself that a beetroot suffers as much as a goat, then he might as well carry on eating meat. Plants have life but that is all the more reason to turn vegetarian. It takes 10 Kilos of plants to make one kilo of meat. So that many more plants are hurt as well. Pet dogs and cats are bred by fanciers. Thousnds of dogs and cats are killed by this breeding industry because they do not fit the specifications and thousands are thrown.42 out because their owners are tired of them .If people stop regarding animals as pets and give them a status as companions, the pedigree industry will stop, animals will become more valuable in themselves and will be kept for different reasons.
	27.	Grazing animals on land not suited for agriculture increases the food supply: how can that be considered wrong?
		There are areas in the world where grazing of live stock is possible but agriculture is not .If conditions were such that people living in these areas cannot trade for crops and must raise livestock to survive, few would question the practice. However, such areas are very small in omparison to the fertile and semi-arid regions currently utilized for intensive grazing and they do not appreciably contribute to the world food supply. The real issue is the intensive grazing in the fertile and semiarid regions. The use of such are for livestock raising reduces the world food supply Keith Acker writes as follows in his A Vegetarian Sourcebook: "Land energy and water resources for livestock agriculture range anywhere from 10 th 1000 times greater than those necessary to produce an equivalent amount of plant foods. And livestock agriculture does not merely use these resources. It depletes them. This is a matter of historical record. Most of the world 's soil, erosion, groundwater depletion and deforestation-factors now.43 threatening the very basis of our food system are the result of this particularly destructive form of food production." Livestock agriculture is the singal greatest cause of worldwide deforestation both historically and currently. Between 1967 and 1975, two thirds of 70 million acres of lost forest in the United States went to grazing. Between 1950 and 1975 the area of human- created pasture land in Central America more than doubled, almost all of it at the expense of rain forests. It is ironical that far from helping to alleviate the food shortage, meat eating is actually the cause of it. Much of the world 's massive hunger problem could be solved by the reduction or elimination of meat consumption of. 38% India's arable land is diverted for fodder for meat animals. If we did not grow the animals this land could be used for cultivation. One acre of land can produce 12,000 kg.of rice or just 120 kg. of meat .It takes 10 kg.of grain to produces 1 kg. of meat. Each animal raised for slaughter eats 10 times as many plants as any human. Meat eating is the single greatest cause of deforestation worldwide. Forests are increasingly being cleared for cropland to feed herds raised for slaughter .As the forest disappears so too does our wildlife .So meat eaters destroy both plant and animal life. People complain about the destruction of forests, the denudation of hillsides, the drying up natural springs and water sources. How ever none of these people link their own meat eating to the 180 million hectares of.44 denuded wasteland in India. Herds that are raised for slaughter are grazed in forests, on roadsides, on village panchyat and government land that becomes totally ravaged by the animal and has to be replanted by the government. Most of our sanctuaries are severely threatened because of the huge inflow of cattle and goats that consume all the young shoots and whose owners murder the wild animals to protect their own flock .70% of all planting efforts by forest departments are doomed to failure because the grazing animals eat the young plant .A single sheep or goat eats the equivalent of 4 hectares year. Multiply that with 450 million goats and that is the amount of land we are losing per year. 180 million hectares have become barren due to forcibly raised goats. As the hillsides becomes bare due to goat grazing, the water dries up and whole hill systems like the Aravallis become deserts creating nomads out of well settled farmers .It takes 3 acres to feed a chicken. 37% of our land is now growing fodder for meat animals .In India if 10% of people gave up eating meat, there would be enough grain freed to feed 4 crore people. In India the milk and meat industries are responsible for huge amounts of deforestation. Each goat eats an average of 10 acres before it is killed .The government spends Rs .6000 on regreening one acre which means each goat is costing this country Rs.60, 000-far more than its meat will ever fetch .Not only that but we pay in terms of water shortage and pollution as well. Animal waste and excreta are poured unfiltered into our lakes and streams..45 The production of one pound of meat requires 2500 gallons of water. More water is spent to feed one meat eater in one month than to feed a vegetarian in one year. It is a misconception that meat export earns the country money. It actually causes both economic and ecological damage. When we export cattle, we lose fertilizer, fuel, draught power, milk, natural pesticide, leather (because of cattle depletion). Slaughter causes water pollution. Everyday the Idgah slaughterhouse in Delhi alone produces 15 thousands liters of blood that goes into Yamuna river. Effluent plants costs money .The land used for growing fodder is diverted from agriculture. Jungle are denuded by herds raised for slaughter. Regreeing areas again costs money. Cruelty is as much an economic issue as it is a moral one. When you strike nature, nature strikes back. Animals are necessary for our own survival. When you protect them, you yourself. Millions of people are losing their jobs and because of meat eaters. Famine is a direct consequence of meat eating. Meat eaters eat 10 times as many plants as vegetarians. After all hoe does a goat /pig/chicken put on its flesh? By eating plants. 10 kilos of plants / grains make one kilo of meat .10 tonnes of plants. 10 kilos of plant/grains provide one tonne of meat. So if you eat meat you ingest a far greater amount of plants than if you just ate plants. Meat eating is the single greatest cause of deforestation as herds raised for slaughter are fattened on our forests laying waste to millions of acres. As the forests disappear so too does.46 our wild life -so meat eaters destroy both plant and animal life .The tiger in fact is being killed not by poachers but by goatherds and by goats as they denude his habitat and poison his waterholes so that they can have the forest to themselves without fear. The leather trade has destroyed the Ganges by throwing effluents into it and India has taken a loan of 500 million pounds to help clean it -a loan that you and I have to pay back with increasing prices of all services. There is an argument that meat provides jobs and foreign exchange. This is utter rubbish. People who sell meat can just as easily sell vegetables and grains. Meat selling is not a skilled job that requires training or talent. When you use a car do you worry that it will throw the tangawallah out of business? Each person must do what is good for his body and soul. Scientists all over the world have come to the conclusion that meat eating is the single greatest destructive economic activity. If you want to save this country's green cover, increase the oxygen in the air, and restore the fresh water in the ground, start with giving up meat. Everything else comes later.
	28.	If we try to eliminate all animals' products, we will be moving back to the Stone Age; who wants that?
		On the contrary! It is a dependency upon animal products that could be seen as returning us to the.47 technologies and mind set of the Stone Age .For example, Stone Age people had to wear furs in Northern climates to avoid freezing. That is no longer the case, thanks to central heating and the ready availability of plenty of good plant and human - made fabrics. If we are to characterize the modern age, it could be in terms of the greater freedoms and options made possible by technological advance and social progress. The Stone Age people had few options and so were forced to rely upon animals for food clothing, and material for their implements. Today, we have an abundance of choices for their implements. Today we have abundances of choices for better foods, warmer clothing, and more efficient materials, none of which need depend upon the killing of animals. The only Stone Age we are in any danger of entering is that constituted by the continuous destruction of animals' habitats in favor of the cement concrete jungle!
	29.	It's virtually impossible to eliminate all animal products from one's consumption; what is the point if you still cause animal death without knowing it?
		Yes, it is very difficult to eliminate all animal products from one's consumption, just as it is impossible to eliminate all accidental killing and infliction of harm that results from our activities. But this cannot justify making it "open season " for any kind of abuse of animals..48 The reasonable goal, given the realities, is to minimize the harms one causes. The point, then is that a great deal of suffering is prevented.
	30.	Wouldn't many customs and traditions, as well as jobs, be lost if we stopped using animals?
		Consider first the issue of customs and traditions. The truth is that some customs and traditions deserve to die out. Examples such as untouchability, suttee thugee, smuggling and piracy abound throughout history: To these the AR supporters add animal exploitation and enslavement. The human animal is an almost infinitely adaptable organism .The loss of the customs listed above has not resulted in any lasting harm to humankind. The same can be confidently predicted for the elimination of animal exploitation. In fact, humankind would likely benefit from a quantum leap of compassion in human affairs. As far as jobs are concerned, the economic aspects are discussed in question #31. It remains to point out that for a human, what is at stake is a job, which can be replaced with one less morally dubious. What is at stake for an animal is the elimination of torture and exploitation, and the possibility for a life of happiness, free from human oppression and brutality. People often say that humans have always eaten animals, as if this is a justification for continuing the practice. According to this logic, we should not try to.49 prevent people from murdering other people, since this has also been done since the earliest of times. Isaac Bashevis Singer (author, Nobel 1978)
	31.	The animal product industries are big business; wouldn't the economy be crippled if they all stopped?
		One cannot justify an action based on its profitability. Many crimes and practices that we view repugnant have been or continue to be profitable: the slave trade, sale of child brides, drug dealing, scams of all sorts, prostitution, child pornography. A good example of this, and one that points up another key consideration is the tobacco industry. It is a multibillion- dollar industry, yet vigorous efforts are proceeding on many fronts to put it out of business. The main problem with it lies in its side-effects, i.e., the massive health consequences and death that it produces, which easily outweigh the immediate profitability. There are side effects to animal exploitation also. Among the most significant are the pollution and deforestation associated with large- scale animal farming. As we see in question #27, these current practices constitute a nonsustainable use of the planet's resources. It is more likely true that the economy will be crippled if the practices continue! The Indian forests continue to be depleted due to over grazing and felling. Water depletion and water pollution is also increasing on account of the polluting industries such as leather..50 Finally, the profits associated with the animal industries stem from market demand and affluence. There is no reason to suppose that this demand cannot be gradually redirected into other industries. Instead of prime beef we can prime artichokes, or prime pasta, etc. Humanity's demand for gourmet food will not vanish with the meat. Similarly, the jobs associated with the animal industries can be gradually redirected into the industries that would spring up to replace the animal industries. (Vice president Gore made a similar point in reference to complaints concerning loss of jobs if logging was halted. He commented that the environmental movement would open up a huge area for jobs that had hereto/ fore been unavailable.) It is my view that the vegetarian manner of living by its purely physical effect on the human temperament would most beneficially influence the lot of mankind Albert Einstein (physicist, Nobel 1921).51
		ARGUMENTS FROM BIOLOGY
	32.	Humans are at the pinnacle of evolution; doesn't that give them the right to use animals as they wish?
		This is one of many arguments that attempt to draw ethical conclusions from scientific observations. In this case, the science is shaky, and the ethical conclusion is dubious. Let us first examine the science. The questioner's view is that evolution has created a linear ranking of general fitness, a ladder if you will, with insects and other " lower" species at the bottom, and humans (of course!) at the top. This idea originated as part of a wider, now discredited evolutionary system called Lamarckism. Charles Darwin's discovery of natural selection overturned this system. Darwin's picture, instead, is of a "radiating bush" of species, with each evolving to adapt more closely to its environment, along its own radius. Under this view, the idea of a pinnacle becomes unclear: yes, humans have adapted well to their niche (though many would dispute this, asserting the nonsustainable nature of our use of the planet's resources), but so have bacteria adapted well to their niche. Can we really say that humans are better adapted to their niche than bacteria, and would it mean anything when the niches are so different? Probably, what the questioner has in mind in using the word " pinnacle" is that humans excel in some particular.52 trait, and that a scale can be created relative to this trait. For example, on a scale of mental capability, humans stand well above bacteria. But a different choice of traits can lead to very different results. Bacteria stand "at pinnacle" when one looks at reproductive fecundity. Birds stand "at the pinnacle" when one looks at flight. Now let us examine the ethics. Leaving aside the dubious ideas of pinnacle of evolution, let us accept that humans are ranked at the top on scale intelligence. Does this give us the right to do as we please with animals, simply on account of their being less brainy? If we say yes, we open a Pandora's box of problems for our/ selves. Does this mean that more intelligent humans can also exploit less intelligent humans as they wish (shall we be slaves to the Einsteins of the world)? Considering a different trait, can the physically superior abuse the weak? Only amorally callous person would agree with this general principle.
	33.	Humans are at the top of the food chain; aren't they therefore justified in killing and eating anything?
		No; otherwise, potential cannibals in our society could claim the same defense for their practice. That we can do something doesn't mean that it is right to do so. We have a lot of power over other creatures, but with great powers come even greater responsibilities, as any parent will testify..53 Humans are at the top of the food chain because they CHOOSE to eat nonhuman animals. There is thus a suggestion of tautology in the questioner 's positions. If we chose not to eat animals, we would not be at the top of the food chain. The idea that superiority in a trait confers rights over the inferior is disposed of in question #32.
	34.	Animals are just machines; why worry about them?
		Centuries ago the philosopher Rene Descartes developed the idea that all nonhuman animals are automatons that cannot feel pain. Followers of Descartes believed that if an animal cried out this was just a reflex, the sort of reaction one might get from a mechanical doll. Consequently, they saw no reason not to experiment on animals without anesthetics. Horrified observers were admonished to pay no attention to the screams of the animal subjects. This idea is now refuted by modern science. Animals are no more "mere machines" than are human beings. Everything science has learned about other spices points out the biological similarities between humans and nonhumans. As Charles Darwin wrote, the differences between humans and other animals are differences of degree, not differences of kind. Since both humans and nonhumans evolved over millions of years and share similar nervous systems and other organs, there is no reason to think we do not share a similar mental and.54 emotional life with other animal spices (especially mammals). Even the European parliament has recognized animals as sentient beings.
	35.	In Nature, animals kills and eats each other; so why should it be wrong for humans?
		Predatory animals must kill to eat. Humans, in contrast, have a choice; they need not eat meat to survive. Humans differ from nonhuman animals in being capable of conceiving of, and acting in accordance with, a system of morals; therefore, we cannot seek moral guidance or precedent from nonhuman animals. The AR philosophy asserts that it is just as wrong for a human to kill and eat a sentient nonhuman, as it is to kill and eat sentient human. To demonstrate the absurdity of seeking moral precedents from nonhuman animals, consider the following variants of the question: "In Nature, animals steal food from each other; so why should it be wrong for humans [to steal]?" "In Nature, animals kill and eat humans; so why should it be wrong for humans [to kill and eat humans]?"
	36.	Natural selection and Darwinism are at work in the world; doesn't that mean it's unrealistic to try to overcome such forces?
		Assuming that Animal Rights concepts somehow clash with Darwinion forces, the questioner must stand.55 accused of selective moral fatalism: our sense of morality is clearly not modeled on the laws of natural selection. Why, then, feel helpless before some of its effects and not before others? Male-dominance, xenophobia, and war -mongering are present in many human societies. Should we venture that some mysterious, universal forces must be at work behind them, and that all attempts at quelling such tendencies should be abandoned? Or, more directly, when people become sick do we abandon them because "survival of the fittest " demands it? We do not abandon them; and we do not agonize about trying to overcome natural selection. There is no reason to believe that the practical implications of the Animal Rights philosophy are maladaptive for humans. On the contrary, and for reasons explained elsewhere in this FAQ, respecting the rights of animals would yield beneficial side- effects for human, such as more- sustainable agricultural practices, and better environmental and health-care polices. The advent of Darwinism led to a substitution of the idea of individual organisms for the old idea of immutable species. The moral individualism implied by AR philosophy substitutes the idea that organisms should be treated according to their individuals capacities for the (old) idea that it is the species of the animal that counts. Thus, moral individualism actually fits well with evolutionary theory..56 Also Darwin's theory of the survival of the fittest only means the fittest within a species i.e., a strong pup has better chances of survival than a runt. It, at no point, talks about the deliberate elimination of a "weaker" species by a" stronger "one.
	37.	Isn't AR opposed to environmental philosophy (as describe, for example, in Deep Ecology")?
		No. It should be declared be clear from many of the answers include in this FAQ, and from perusal of the literature that the philosophy and goals of AR are complimentary to the goals of the mainstream environmental movement. Michael W. Fox sees AR and environmentalism as two aspects of a dialectic that reconciles concerns for the rights of individuals (human and nonhuman) with concerns for the integrity of the biosphere. Some argue that a morality based o individual rights is necessarily opposed to one based on holistic environmental views, e.g., the sanctity of the biosphere. However, an environmental ethic that attributes some form of rights to all individuals, including inanimate ones, can be developed. Such an ethic, by showing respect for the individuals that make up the biosphere, would also show respect for the biosphere as a whole, thus achieving the aims of holistic environmentalism. It is clear that a rights view is not necessarily in conflict with a holistic view..57 In reference to the concept of deep ecology and the claim that it bears negatively on AR, Fox believes such claims to be unfounded. The following text is excerpted from "Inhumane Society ", by Micheal W.Fox: "Deep ecologists support the philosophy of preserving the natural abundance and diversity of plants and animals in natural ecosystems …The deep ecologists should oppose the industrialized, nonsubsistence exploitation of wildlife because...it is fundamentally unsound ecologically, because by favoring some species over others, population imbalances and extinctions of undesired species would be inevitable." "Arne Naess (… arguably the founder of the deep eclogy movement)…. states: The intuition of biocentric equality is that all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live and blossom and to reach their own forms of unfolding and self realization…" Michael W. Fox (Vice President of HSUS).58
		INSECTS AND PLANTS
	38.	What about insects? Do they rights too?
		Before considering the issue of rights, let us firstaddress the question "What about insects?". Strictly speaking, insects are small invertebrate animals of the class. Insect a, having an adult stage characterized by three pairs of legs, a segmented body with three major divisions, and usually two pairs of wings. We'll adopt the looser definition, which includes like similar invertebrate animals such as spiders centipedes, and ticks Insects have a ganglionic nervous system, in contrast to the central nervous system of vertebrates. Such a system is characterized by local aggregates of neurons, called ganglia, that are associated with, and specialized for, the body segment with which they are co-located. There are interconnections between ganglia but these connections function not so much as global integrating pathway, but rather for local segmental coordination. For example, the waves of leg motion that propagate along the body of a centipede are mediated by the intersegmental connections. In some species the cephalic ganglia are large and complex enough to support very complex behavior (e.g., the lobster and octopus) .The cuttlefish (not an insect but another invertebrate with a ganglion nervous system) is claimed by some to be about as intelligent as dog. Insects are capable of primitive learning and do exhibit what many would characterize as intelligence. Spiders are known for their skills and craftiness; whether this can be dismissed,.59 as instinct is arguable. Certainly, bees can learn. When offered a reward from a perch of a certain color, they return first to perches of that color. They also learn the location of food and transmit that information to their colleagues. In addition to a primitive mental life as described above, there is some evidence that insects can experience pain and suffering .The earthworm nervous system, for example, secretes an opiate substance when the earthworm is injured. Similar responses are seen in vertebrates and are generally accepted to be a mechanism for the attenuation of pain. On the other hand, the opiates are also implicated in functions not associated with analgesia, such as thermoregulation and appetite control. Nevertheless, the association of secretion with tissue injury is highly Suggestive. Earthworms also wriggle quite vigorously when impaled on a hook. In possible opposition to this are other observations .For example, the abdomen of a feeding wasp can be clipped off and the head may go on sucking (presumably in no distress?). Singer quotes three criteria for deciding if an organism has the capacity to suffer from pain: 1) there are behavioral indications, 2) there is an appropriate nervous system, and 3) there is an evolutionary usefulness for the experience of pain. These criteria seem to be satisfied for insects, if only in primitive way. Now we are equipped to tackle the issue of insect right. First, one might argue that the issue is not so.60 compelling as for other animals because industries are not built around the exploitation of insects. But this is untrue; large industries are built around honey production, silk production, and cochineal/carmine production, and, of course, mass insect death results from our use of insecticides. Even if the argument were true, it should not prevent us from attempting to be consistent in the application of our principles to all animals. Insects are a part of the Animal Kingdom and some special arguments would be the Animal Kingdom and special arguments would be required to exclude them from the general AR argument. Some would draw a line at some level of complexity of the nervous system, e.g., only animals capable of operant conditioning needs be enfranchised, Others may quarrel with this line and place it elsewhere. Some may postulate a scale of life with an ascending capacity to feel pain and suffer. They might also mark a cut- off on the scale, below which rights are not actively asserted. Is the cut-off above insects and the lower invertebrates? Or should there be no cut-off? This is one of the issues still being actively debated in the AR community. People who strive to live without cruelty will attempt to push the line back as far a possible, giving the benefit of the doubt where there is doubt. Certainly, one can avoid unnecessary cruelty to insects' .the practical issue involved in enfranchising insects are dealt with the following two questions..61 I want to realize brotherhood or identity not merely with the beings called human, but I want to realize identity with all life, even with such things as crawl upon earth. Mahatma Gandhi (statesman and philosopher) What is that should trace the insuperable line? …The question is not, Can they reason? Nor; can they talk? but, can they suffer? Jeremy Bentham (philosopher)
	39.	Do I have to be careful not to walk on ants?
		The Jains of India would say yes! Some of their more devout members wear gauze to masks to avoid inhaling and killing small insects and microbes. Regardless of how careful we are, we will cause some suffering as a side effect of living .The goal is to avoid unnecessary suffering and to minimize the suffering we cause. This is a far cry from wanton, intentional infliction of cruelty. I refer here to the habit of some of pulling off insects' wings for fun, or